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ABSTRACT 
Privacy research has not helped practitioners – who struggle to 
reconcile users’ demands for information privacy with 
information security, legislation, information management and use 
– to improve privacy practice. Beginning with the principle that 
information security is necessary but not sufficient for privacy, we 
present an innovative layered framework - the Privacy Security 
Trust (PST) Framework - which integrates, in one model, the 
different activities practitioners must undertake for effective 
privacy practice. The PST Framework considers information 
security, information management and data protection legislation 
as privacy hygiene factors, representing the minimum processes 
for effective privacy practice. The framework also includes 
privacy influencers - developed from previous research in 
information security culture, information ethics and information 
culture - and privacy by design principles. The framework helps to 
deliver good privacy practice by providing: 1) a clear hierarchy of 
the activities needed for effective privacy practice; 2) delineation 
of information security and privacy; and 3) justification for 
placing data protection at the heart of those activities involved in 
maintaining information privacy. We present a proof-of-concept 
application of the PST Framework to an example technology – 
electricity smart meters. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.1.2 [User/Machine Systems]; Human factors; K.4.1 [Public 
Policy Issues]: Privacy. 
General Terms 
Management, Design, Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Privacy, trust, security, framework. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In his 2004 book, Secrets and Lies, Bruce Schneier describes how, 
after writing Applied Cryptography, he “learned to look beyond 
the cryptography, at the entire system, to find weaknesses.” [58]: 
he observed that weaknesses are often caused by hardware, 
software, networks and people, and not failures in cryptographic 
mathematics. He concluded that: 1) “Security is a chain; it's only 
as secure as the weakest link”; and 2) “Security is a process, not a 
product” [58].  
Over the past decade, information security researchers and 
practitioners have recognized that human behavior is a major 
potential source of vulnerabilities, and organizations have started 
to understand that information security is more than a collection 
of physical and technical controls – it must be considered and 
managed as a socio-technical system. We argue that, although 
technology plays a vital part in safeguarding privacy, a similar 
holistic approach is required to deliver effective privacy practice. 
The UK Information Commissioner’s Office agrees - it suggests 
the need for a privacy by design ecosystem “[...] to ensure that 
privacy becomes embedded not only in all aspects of the systems 
lifecycle, but for organisations becomes part of ‘the way we do 
things around here’. [...] Within each organisation, the mandate 
will need to spread down from executive management throughout 
the organisation, being delivered as policies, standards and 
implementation guidelines” [68]. Cavoukian proposes the idea of 
SmartPrivacy [18], augmenting privacy by design (PbD)1 [14, 16], 
to include law, regulation, market forces, education and 
awareness, independent oversight, fair information practices etc. 
Whilst these approaches identify elements that should be 
considered, they do not provide practitioners with a single 
framework for planning and maintaining for information privacy. 
The fair information practices referred to by Cavoukian relate to 
generic guidelines setting out the principles of fair collection and 
use of personal information, whilst providing privacy protection 
for individuals. Practical expressions of these principles are found 
in the US Department of Homeland Security’s Fair Information 
Practice Principles [69]2 and the OECD’s Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
[34]. These principles also underpin data protection legislation, 
e.g. the European Union’s Data Protection Directive [29]. We take 
fair information practices to mean the general principles – 
encompassing notice, consent, access, quality and integrity, 
transparency, purpose specification, data minimization, 
appropriateness, security, accountability and auditing when 
collecting and processing personal data.  
                                                                
1 See http://privacybydesign.ca for further information. 
2 The US Department of Homeland Security’s Fair Information 
Practice Principles are more extensive than the US Federal 
Trade Commission’s Fair Information Practices in the 
Electronic Marketplace [30], which contain only notice, choice, 
access and protection, and security, and were criticised for being 
watered down [32]. 
 
Privacy research has made considerable progress in terms of 
understanding privacy economics, people’s privacy concerns, 
behavior and decision-making, and the effect of technology 
design. However, there has been no attempt to create a framework 
that unifies the insights from research on privacy, information 
security and trust, and represents the composition of privacy of the 
parties involved in a technology-mediated interaction. 
Practitioners currently struggle to figure out how to reconcile 
privacy with information security, governance, data protection 
legislation, trust, and information management and use. With 
increasing legislative pressure and consumer awareness of 
privacy, practitioners face the challenging task of understanding 
how to meet data protection laws, maintain consumer trust and 
ensure operational security – all at the same time. 
The Privacy Security Trust (PST) Framework presented in this 
paper models the composition of the privacy practice of the 
parties in a technology-mediated interaction, the construction of 
the trust between them, and the characteristics of the technology 
involved. The objective of the PST Framework is not to explain 
privacy behavior, or the motivations of individuals and 
organizations, but to help deliver good privacy practice by 
providing: 1) a clear hierarchy of the activities needed for 
effective privacy practice; 2) delineation of information security 
and privacy; and 3) justification for placing data protection at the 
heart of those activities involved in maintaining information 
privacy. 
To overcome the definitional complexities surrounding privacy 
[25, 62] the PST Framework focuses on information privacy. 
However, information privacy is not a binary construct: what is 
considered sensitive, or private, information varies between 
individuals, and depends on factors such as information usage, 
context and the perception of the information receiver (e.g. “Who 
or what has access to my personal information?”) [2, 3, 7, 8]. 
Privacy is also temporal: sensitivity of information may change 
over time, e.g. an individual’s willingness to disclose their age. A 
definition of information privacy must therefore address the 
contextual nature of privacy, its dynamism, and the use to which 
information is put. 
Using Solove’s [62] taxonomy of privacy problems, Westin’s [73] 
control-based definition of privacy, and considering the non-
binary nature of information privacy, we define information 
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information they consider sensitive at a prescribed point in time is 
collected, processed, stored 3 and communicated to others, within 
a given context”; for clarity the remainder of this paper uses 
privacy to refer to information privacy. This idea of informational 
self-determination underpins fair information practices, and hence 
European data protection laws, even though in practice, fair 
information practices typically depend upon “procedural 
protections” [6]. 
This paper initially considers the principal prerequisites for 
privacy and the influences upon it. It then describes existing 
frameworks for privacy, information security and trust in 
technology-mediated interactions, and sets out some of their 
shortcomings. We then examine three additional areas of work 
relevant to the PST Framework: information culture, information 
ethics and PbD. We then describe the PST Framework in detail, 
                                                                
3 Information storage is not identified in Solove’s ‘taxonomy of 
privacy problems’. 
particularly its innovative use of a layered approach to privacy. 
Finally, we present a proof-of-concept application of the PST 
Framework to an example technology – electricity smart meters. 
2. HYGIENE FACTORS & INFLUENCERS 
Camp [13] argues that privacy requires security, because privacy 
is the ability of the subject of the information to control the 
information, and security is required to maintain control over 
information. An information security failure is one of the more 
obvious reasons for the inadvertent disclosure of private 
information; as recent examples show [53, 67], i.e. “data breaches 
as a privacy problem” [22]. Thus, the information security 
practice of the party being trusted (trustee) with sensitive 
information in a technology-mediated interaction is one of the 
factors in the decision by the trusting party (trustor) to trust it. 
However, “security is not sufficient for privacy, since the owner 
and the subject of the information may have different interests in 
and uses for the data.” [13]. Therefore sound information security 
practices are necessary, but not sufficient, for privacy.  
If information security practices are a prerequisite for privacy, 
they become a privacy hygiene factor. Another key privacy 
hygiene factor is legislation pertaining to privacy and data 
protection - representing the ‘letter of the law’. Examples include 
the sector-specific approach in the US, such as the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996 (HIPAA) and 
the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the more comprehensive 
protections of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (UKDPA), which 
cover information collection, access, use, storage and 
dissemination. Legislation, such as US sector-specific statutes and 
the E.U. Data Protection Directive, establish a regulatory floor, 
shape compliance-oriented measures, and justify trustees’ initial 
commitment of resources to safeguarding customers’ privacy [6]. 
However, legislation can play a limited role in defining what 
information privacy means for organizations [6].  
Camp argues that “[r]eliability, security and privacy are critical in 
[Internet] commerce systems” [13], and that reliability and 
security are interdependent. This excludes the critical role of 
sound information management practices as a privacy hygiene 
factor. The fact that “[…] the control of information enabled by 
security does not imply privacy” [11], suggests a trustee requires 
other mechanisms to ensure privacy. One such mechanism is the 
ability to manage information effectively, so a trustee is aware of 
the location and status of the information it is responsible for; this 
is particularly important for meeting legislative requirements 
pertaining to information collection and processing. For example, 
under the UKDPA, effective information management practices 
are required to efficiently handle Subject Access Requests. This 
suggests a set of privacy hygiene factors, representing a minimum 
set of activities for effective privacy practice (lower half of Figure 
1). 
The top half of Figure 1 shows privacy influencers, which include 
information culture [20, 21] and information ethics [22, 59, 61]. 
These shape how a trustee manages and uses information – its 
privacy behavior. For organizations, this privacy behavior [19] 
underpins organizational trust, one of the key determinants of trust 
- a trustor is more likely to trust an organization exhibiting good 
privacy behavior. Information use, identified as an important 
factor in a user’s decision to engage in a technology-mediated 
interaction [2], is another privacy influencer, along with the 
information principles used to guide a trustee’s information use 
decisions.  
 Figure 1. Information Privacy Practice Hygiene Factors and 
Privacy Influencers 
An organization’s information principles will be based on 
applicable information legislation, but are likely to extend it, so 
that an organization’s information privacy practice encapsulates 
data subjects’ expectations of its privacy behavior. For example, 
under the UKDPA a court may order an organization to rectify, 
block, erase or destroy all inaccurate data it holds on a data 
subject. However, organizations may choose to exceed this, e.g. 
by ensuring its technology platform and information management 
processes allow customers to view, amend and delete all 
information the organization holds about them. In essence, if the 
privacy hygiene factor information legislation refers to the ‘letter 
of the law’, the privacy influencer information principles 
represents the ‘spirit of the law’. 
Information management requires information security to ensure 
its information-sharing decisions are carried out correctly. An 
organization’s approach to information management is determined 
– in turn - by information principles and organizational 
characteristics (e.g. its culture and ethics). A potential hierarchy 
therefore begins to emerge, flowing from a trustee’s softer 
influencing attributes (privacy influencers), such as information 
ethics, information culture and information principles, down to the 
concrete legislative requirements, information management 
practices and information security (privacy hygiene factors). 
3. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS 
3.1 Users’ Privacy Perceptions 
Adams & Sasse [2] introduced a model of the principal factors 
forming users’ privacy perceptions when engaging in a 
technology-mediated interaction (Figure 2). The model shows the 
relationships between the three principal privacy factors 
considered by a user for a given context: information receiver (the 
entity receiving the information); information usage (what the 
information receiver will use the information for); and 
information sensitivity (the user’s own perception of how sensitive 
the information is). The model also illustrates the relevant privacy 
issues: trust in the information receiver; the risk or benefit of 
information usage (i.e. privacy cost vs. benefit trade-off); and the 
user’s judgment concerning information sensitivity.  
This model was originally developed to explain privacy issues in 
multimedia communication [1], but it can be applied to other 
technology-mediated interactions where a trustor (user or 
information sender4) decides to trust a trustee5 (information 
                                                                
4 An information sender equates to Adams & Sasse’s information 
broadcaster [2]. 
receiver), and engage in a technology-mediated interaction within 
a given context. For example, the model can be used for a 
scenario in which an information sender (e.g. customer) submits 
personal financial information to an information receiver (e.g. 
financial services organization), within the context of a credit card 
application. In this example, the information sender’s expected 
information usage is to support their credit card application, with 
the information sensitivity likely to be high (e.g. salary 
information, employer name and address, credit history etc.).  
 
Figure 2. A User’s Privacy Perceptions. Source: [2]6. 
In the case of applying for a credit card, an individual’s expected 
information usage will be dictated by two informational norms: 1) 
information appropriateness (e.g. requesting information 
concerning an applicant’s credit history is acceptable, but not their 
medical history); and 2) information distribution (e.g. information 
is sent to a credit reference agency, but not an e-commerce vendor 
who targets the individual with adverts) [50]. Preventing the 
violation of customers’ privacy expectations concerning 
information use and reuse – “a harm avoidance approach” – can 
play an important role in developing organizations’ privacy 
practices [6]. 
Adams & Sasse’s model captures the principal components of 
information privacy in technology-mediated interactions. 
However, it does not cover: 1) different types of information 
usage; 2) unauthorized information usage by third parties; 3) the 
process by which an information sender trusts a technology and 
information receiver; and 4) the impact on individuals’ privacy 
perception of passive vs. active data collection. 
3.2 Information Security 
There has been a growing realization amongst researchers and 
practitioners that effective information security is more than a 
collection of physical and technical controls. Those responsible 
for an organization’s information security have to be cognizant of 
the threats from social engineering [9] and the (in)action and 
behavior of employees [27]. Information security therefore 
requires a security-aware socio-technical system with employee 
involvement, awareness and commitment [70].  
The paradigm shift of seeing information security as a socio-
technical system has led to the idea of greater integration between 
research in information security and organizational culture, and 
                                                                                                           
5 Assuming the trustor is in a position to actively choose whether 
or not to trust the trustee. 
6 Original diagram source: Adams, A (2001) Users’ Perceptions 
of Privacy in Multimedia Communications, University College 
London [1]. 
the concept of information security culture [43, 65, 70, 71]. An 
information security culture is one in which information security 
skills become part of employees’ everyday practice, with the aim 
of reaching a point where information security culture is 
indistinguishable from organizational culture [65].  
There have been significant advances in information security 
practice, both in terms of addressing human security behavior, and 
closer integration with business objectives and legislative 
requirements. Nevertheless, there are still two shortcomings in 
terms of information security’s relationship with privacy: 1) an 
inability to clearly articulate the relationship between data 
protection legislation, security and privacy; and 2) the need to 
better understand the influence of information security culture on 
privacy. 
Practitioners currently have little guidance on how to map data 
protection legislation onto information security and privacy 
safeguards and practices. Despite increasing recognition that 
information security is a socio-technical system, there is still an 
emphasis on protecting data through the implementation of 
information security management systems in accordance with 
standards such as the ISO/IEC 27000, as well as adherence to data 
protection legislation. So in most organizations, data protection is 
the responsibility of Information Security Departments. This data-
centric view of data protection will cause problems for 
organizations as customers demand greater control over their 
personal information, and privacy becomes a point of 
differentiation for customers when selecting organizations to 
transact with. 
Adams & Sasse argued - because privacy breaches can have a 
serious impact on individuals’ lives - effective privacy protection 
is about more than protecting data [2]. Safeguarding individuals’ 
privacy requires organizations to not only adhere to data 
protection legislation and provide a minimum level of privacy, but 
also free data protection from its current tight coupling with 
information security, placing it at the heart of an organization’s 
principles for handling customers’ information. We argue that 
current approaches to data protection and information security do 
not facilitate such an approach. 
If “[a]n information security culture can be defined as the way 
things are done in an organisation to protect information 
assets”[70], the information security culture of an organization is 
likely to significantly affect its attitude to, and protection of, the 
privacy of those entrusting it with their information.  
3.3 Trust 
Camp observed that “operational definitions of trust require a 
party [(trustor)] to make a rational decision based on knowledge 
of possible rewards for trusting and not trusting [a trustee]”. She 
also suggested that “trust is an element of all systems” [11] and 
proposed a three-dimensional definition of trust, constructed from 
a trustee’s intent and competence in providing reliability, security 
and privacy [13]. However, this does not explain the role of the 
privacy hygiene factors information management and adherence 
to legislation, as well as the role of privacy influencers in building 
a trustor’s trust in a trustee’s information privacy practice. 
A trustor engaging in a technology-mediated interaction is likely 
to have assumptions and expectations of the technology and 
trustee’s privacy behavior. These may be influenced by trust 
signals emitted by the trustee, allowing a trustor to determine if 
trust should be given when engaging in a technology-mediated 
interaction [56]. These trust signals include trust symbols (e.g. use 
of HTTPS and trusted third party seals), and trust symptoms (e.g. 
user reviews, professionalism of web site design and usability) 
[56], as well as previous offline experience, societal norms, and 
the trustee’s reputation. Similarly, stated compliance with privacy-
specific regulatory regimes signals privacy leadership to 
customers and business partners, hence engendering trust [6] – 
privacy is “a core value associated with trust” [6]. 
If a trustor’s experience of a trustee, or technology, does not 
match their privacy expectations and assumptions, because of a 
malicious trustee, error or badly designed technology leaking 
sensitive information, the trustor is likely to feel its privacy has 
been invaded and reject the technology and/or the trustee [2, 3]. 
There are two determinants of trust in a trustee’s ability to protect 
privacy: operation of the technology and privacy behavior of the 
trustee. The relationship between privacy and trust, and peoples’ 
reaction when the privacy behavior of a trustee does not match 
their expectations, is illustrated by the reaction of US consumers 
to corporate privacy breaches in the late 1990s – ultimately 
leading to organizations abandoning plans for information sharing 
deals [6]. 
Trust research has provided researchers with insights into the 
construction of trust– particularly in technology mediated 
interactions [31, 48, 55, 56, 75]. However, there has been a lack of 
guidance for practitioners. Riegelsberger et al. [56] provided a 
framework for understanding how trust between trustor and 
trustee is constructed, and identified the role of trust symptoms 
and trust symbols. This needs to be integrated with privacy and 
information security culture in a single comprehensive 
framework. Furthermore, if trust has two principal determinants – 
technological trust and organizational trust - the privacy 
characteristics of a technology and the privacy behavior of the 
trustee must be represented. 
A practitioner needs an answer to the question, “What activities do 
I need to perform to safeguard the information privacy of my 
customers and adhere to data protection legislation, and how will 
these activities affect the trust my customers have in me?” 
Existing trust frameworks have only provided a partial glimpse of 
what is required to address this question. 
4. OTHER RELATED WORK 
There are three additional areas included within the PST 
Framework:  
1. Information culture: The influence of an organization’s 
information culture on its information collection, use, 
management and dissemination. 
2. Information ethics: How organizations make decisions 
concerning information collection, use, management and 
dissemination whilst balancing an individual’s privacy 
rights and concerns with organizational objectives - 
particularly those decisions the organization has not made 
before. 
3. Privacy by design (PbD): The embedding of privacy 
awareness throughout all stages of a technology’s design 
and implementation lifecycle. 
4.1 Information Culture 
Information culture, like privacy, is a term “frequently used but 
without consensus as to its definition” [23]. Most researchers 
agree that it relates to the behavioral patterns, values, norms and 
attitudes of an organization concerning the value and use of 
information in achieving its operational and strategic objectives 
[20, 21, 23, 24]. Pragmatically, information culture consists of: 
“communication flows, cross-organizational partnerships, 
internal environment (cooperativeness, openness and trust); 
information systems management; and processes and procedures” 
[20]. 
Curry & Moore’s [23] exploratory conceptual model attempts to 
capture the evolution and components of an organization’s 
information culture in terms of people, processes and information, 
and illustrates how information culture affects, and is affected by, 
organizational culture. They suggest an organization should aim to 
reach a point at which its “information culture is no longer 
distinguishable from the organizational culture” [23] – 
reminiscent of the objectives of information security culture [65]. 
There has been some research on how firms treat sensitive 
information, and their organizational privacy behaviors [19, 22]. 
However, further investigation is required on the specific effect of 
information culture on organizations’ attitude to privacy. 
Information use plays a critical role in safeguarding a user’s 
privacy [2], and information culture has a significant influence on 
information use outcomes [21]. 
4.2 Information Ethics 
Organizations often face ethical dilemmas [59] when their 
existing information management principles or rules do not 
adequately address a new requirement for information collection, 
use and dissemination. These “moments of truth” [44, 45] often 
result from increased demand for the collection, storage, 
dissemination and retrieval of information, as well as the 
technological imperative of society’s desire for progress [45]. A 
principal cause of this has been the rise of customer-centered 
interaction as a competitive advantage, necessitating the collection 
and processing of increasing amounts of personal data [10]; 
organizations’ decision making process when faced with such 
ethical dilemmas is the focus of information ethics.  
If an organization’s management is not aware of the existence of 
ethical dilemmas concerning its information collection, use and 
dissemination, or it is preoccupied with more pressing operational 
matters [59], a situation is likely to arise in which its employees’ 
compliance with the organization’s privacy policies drifts - 
perhaps due to commercial or resource pressures - until finally the 
threat of legislative action forces the organization to act [60]. This 
leads to emotional dissonance because individual employees face 
their own ethical dilemmas when there is insufficient guidance by 
the organization’s information principles and guidelines, and they 
are often reluctant to challenge an organization’s ethics [60]. Even 
when an organization imposes certain rules, ethical decisions are 
still often “left to an individual to decide which norms and 
standards will guide his or her ethical argumentation.” [59]. 
Bamberger & Mulligan [6] argue that evidence from their 
investigation of corporate privacy practice shows that even in the 
absence of comprehensive privacy and data protection legislation, 
an organization’s information culture, information ethics, and the 
embodiment of the ‘spirit of the law’ in its information principles 
can still lead to the creation of effective privacy practice. They 
further suggest that despite the patchwork sectoral approach to 
privacy legislation in the US, e.g. HIPAA, the 1970 Fair Credit 
Reporting Act and the 1974 Privacy Act, corporate attention to 
privacy has increased since 1998, exemplified by organizations’ 
desire to meet customers’ expectations and prevent substantive 
harms to their privacy, and the establishment of direct privacy 
leadership, e.g. the creation of Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) roles. 
Organizations’ privacy practices have still been driven to some 
extent by a form of regulatory pressure from state data breach 
notification statutes, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) - 
who has emerged as an activist privacy regulator – with its 
statutory mandate to police, with considerable discretion and 
unpredictability, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” [6]. 
The relationship between privacy, data protection and privacy 
legislation, and ethical decision-making is further strengthened 
when one considers that the ethical issues relating to information 
use are often categorized into: 1) privacy – the ability of people to 
control the dissemination of sensitive information; 2) accuracy – 
the quality and accuracy of information held; 3) property – 
information ownership and control; and 4) accessibility – access 
to information held [10].  
Most organizational privacy violations can be categorized as 
information re-use and unauthorized access to personal 
information – the former legal (if not necessarily ethical), and the 
latter in violation of laws or corporate policies [22]. If prevention 
of unauthorized access is one of the principal roles of information 
security, the role of information ethics is to ensure decisions about 
information re-use are made within an organizational culture that 
aims to avoid substantive harm to peoples’ privacy [6]. 
Information use decisions are underpinned by an organization’s 
ethical decisions, which can enhance or damage its reputation - 
hence the trust individuals place in it. 
4.3 Privacy by Design 
When an individual interacts with another party via a technology 
platform, and this leads to an invasion of the individual’s privacy, 
they may reject the technology platform and/or the other party [2]. 
Such privacy invasions can be the result of: 
 technology being designed or deployed unethically [8], as 
suggested for some peer-to-peer (P2P) software [64]; or 
 technology being designed without privacy and security 
uppermost in the mind of the designers and implementers. 
This results in the user being presented with a confusing 
interface, and little or no control over their privacy [33]. 
To address these technology design issues and ensure privacy 
protection is embedded throughout all stages of a technology’s 
design and implementation lifecycle, PbD – with its Seven 
Foundational Principles [15] - was developed to ensure that the 
collection, use and dissemination of information by technologies 
adhered to fair information practices.  
PbD emerged from work on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
(PETs) [14]. Since then, further research has been undertaken in 
this field [16, 40, 41]. The UK Information Commissioner 
published a report on the subject [68], and the European 
Commission’s plans for revising the European Union’s Data 
Protection Directive has mentioned the potentially important role 
of PbD in establishing safeguards and mechanisms to make data 
protection more effective [28]. 
In 2009 Cavoukian reported [18] that her view of PbD’s scope had 
expanded to include business practices, and physical design and 
infrastructures, as well as information technologies - so called 
SmartPrivacy. This wider scope is particularly welcome given the 
discussion earlier in this paper on the impact of an organization’s 
information culture, ethics and security on privacy.  
5. THE PST FRAMEWORK 
5.1 Overall Structure 
The PST Framework (Figure 3) is constructed from the notion of 
an information sender engaging in a technology-mediated 
interaction with an information receiver via a technology 
platform. In the PST Framework the technology platform is 
referred to as a technology lens to highlight that when an 
information sender views an information receiver through a 
poorly implemented or designed technology platform, they may 
experience a distorted view of the information receiver – no 
matter how well-intentioned the information receiver may be. The 
socio-technical system of a technology lens and information 
receiver constitutes a technology service. 
 
Figure 3. PST Framework Components 
Table 1 shows five examples of how the PST Framework can be 
used to represent technology-mediated interactions. Although it is 
natural to assume an information sender is an individual (e.g. e-
commerce website customer), and an information receiver is an 
organization (e.g. e-commerce retailer); the last two examples in 
Table 1 show the PST Framework makes no such assumption. 
Table 1. Example Mapping of PST Framework Components 
 
Technology Service 
Information 
Sender 
Technology Lens Information 
Receiver 
Consumer Shopping web site Online retailer 
Individual in 
premises 
CCTV cameras and 
recording equipment 
Premises owner or 
manager 
Electricity 
consumer 
and/or 
household 
Smart electricity 
meter 
Electricity company 
Small 
business 
Online business-to-
business ordering 
system 
Wholesaler  
P2P user P2P file-sharing client P2P user 
 
There will be occasions when an information sender is not able to 
choose if they wish to interact with a technology service; for 
example: 
 When use of a technology service is mandatory. For 
example, an information sender has to use a web site to 
provide their personal information when travelling to the 
United States and some European countries.  
 An information sender may be unaware they are engaging 
with a technology service, e.g. the positioning of a 
webcam in a ‘public’ space, such as a staff common room, 
without clear notification [3]. 
 An information sender may not possess sufficient 
specialist knowledge to allow them to understand when 
they may be passively engaging with a technology service, 
e.g. the placing of tracking cookies on a user’s PC when 
they visit a web site. 
When individuals discover they have been unwittingly engaging 
with a technology service, they may respond emotionally and 
reject the technology lens, and/or distrust the motives of the 
information receiver [2, 3]. In both instances the information 
sender is a passive subject of data collection, which is likely to 
significantly increase their privacy concerns. 
In the case where the information sender actively chooses to 
engage with a technology service, trust signals [56] received from 
the technology service, prompt the information sender to decide to 
entrust the technology service – hence the information receiver – 
with information, some of which the information sender may 
consider sensitive. In essence, “[…] the final placement of trust is 
illustrated by a willingness to share personal information.” [11] 
The technology lens should be considered a virtual technology 
platform, as it is likely to consist of multiple computer systems; in 
the case of e-commerce it will include a web server farm, 
application servers and back-end databases – potentially 
geographically distributed. An information sender will not make a 
distinction between these different computers - viewing them as 
an homogenous system [12] - but will simply decide whether to 
trust the combination of information receiver and technology lens 
- the technology service. This is particularly important in terms of 
trust and forgiveness - Camp et al. hypothesized that there is “[…] 
no significant systematic difference in people’s reactions to 
betrayals that originate from human actions, on the one hand, and 
computer failure on the other” [12]. People are therefore unable to 
differentiate between privacy breaches caused by technology 
failure and those due to human actions within a technology service 
- was it a failure in technology or human agency which resulted in 
the Sony PlayStation breach [53]? 
Figure 3 shows information control, which the technology service 
provides, allowing the information sender to control the flow of 
information to the information receiver. For example, the ability 
to easily and intuitively control access to shared data is of 
particular importance in collaborative environments [7]. 
Information control may be via the technology lens, e.g. through 
technical design features allowing the information sender to: opt-
in or opt-out of the technology service; select which information 
to provide to the technology service; and view the information the 
information receiver has access to. The information control 
provided by an information receiver’s internal systems and 
processes should flow seamlessly through the technology lens to 
the information sender. Failure to achieve this may cause well-
intentioned attempts to provide the information sender with the 
functionality to control their information flow, to be omitted or 
distorted by a poorly implemented or designed technology lens. 
As shown in Figure 3, information control may occur outside of 
the technology service, through mechanisms such as the 
UKDPA’s Subject Access Request or HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, or 
communicating directly with the information receiver, e.g. 
requesting a customer account to be deleted. 
There may be situations in which there is more than one 
information receiver - some of whom may not be known to the 
information sender. This is provided in the PST Framework by 
allowing an information receiver to be an information sender, 
either simultaneously or at a later point in time. For example, in a 
CCTV system an information sender (e.g. an individual working 
in a street market) has information captured in the form of images 
of herself working in the market and sent to an information 
receiver (e.g. local government authority). In this particular 
example the information sender is a passive actor, although they 
may be aware that image recording is taking place because of 
street signs explaining the information receiver’s intended use of 
the information (e.g. ensuring the safety of the public). If a central 
government agency (e.g. social services) subsequently seizes the 
CCTV tapes, the local government authority becomes an 
information sender, with the central government agency as a 
secondary information receiver. The central government agency 
may then use the images for another purpose, such as detecting 
benefit payment fraud.  
5.2 Technology Service 
The socio-technical nature of a technology service emphasizes the 
point that - to fully understand the privacy impact of a technology 
- it is necessary to not only consider the core technologies 
involved (e.g. hardware and software), but how those technologies 
are implemented, and the organizational processes, principles and 
culture surrounding them, i.e. the context in which the technology 
service is operating also requires consideration. For example, a 
technology service that embeds an RFID chip in a patient to track 
them and monitor their health whilst in hospital may be 
considered acceptable from a privacy point of view. The same 
technology service used outside of the context of a hospital may 
be viewed as unacceptable. Bellotti & Sellen suggest, 
“[t]echnology is not neutral when it comes to privacy.” [8], but we 
argue that a core technology cannot automatically be considered 
privacy-invasive; it is the manner or context in which it is used 
which determines this.  
An example of how a technology in itself should not be 
considered privacy-invasive is the use of RFID in product tags 
attached to items in a retail outlet. RFID tags can be managed in 
accordance with robust security and privacy processes by 
permanently disabling them with the appropriate kill command at 
the checkout. In this scenario, most observers would not consider 
them to impact on their privacy. However, if the RFID product tag 
was not disabled, or was sewn into a garment unbeknown to the 
wearer, and they then received offers for similar products when 
visiting other stores, this would be considered by most to be an 
infringement of their privacy. This example highlights the 
importance of considering not only the core technologies 
themselves, but their mode of implementation, the organizational 
processes surrounding their implementation and continued 
operation, and the objectives (worthy or otherwise) of the 
organization deploying the technologies.  
5.3 Component Definitions 
Before progressing further it is prudent to formally define the 
components within the PST Framework.  
5.3.1 Information Asset (IA) 
As shown in Figure 3, the information receiver and information 
sender possess information, which are considered as information 
assets in the PST Framework. ‘Asset’ here is employed in its 
figurative and extended sense to mean “a thing, person, quality, 
etc., that serves as an advantage, support, or source of strength” 
[51]. Building on this idea of an asset as something of value, 
information asset has been defined as “knowledge or data that has 
value to the organization” [36]. We define information asset (IA) 
as “information endowed with value, relevance and purpose for 
an individual, group or organization”.  
If an IA is defined as sensitive by data protection legislation, an 
organization must decide if other IAs should be considered private 
for all users, or if information control mechanisms will suffice for 
those IAs considered private by only some users. This echoes the 
idea of two types of private information [7]: 
 Normative - information relating to an individual that is 
inherently private, e.g. medical records. 
 Operational – information whose sensitivity depends on 
the individual, e.g. salary. 
Pragmatically, IAs should therefore be categorized with one of the 
following attributes:  
 Non-sensitive - generally not considered sensitive. 
 Choice-sensitive – this is the same as Bellotti’s [7] 
operational privacy, i.e. a user can use information control 
mechanisms to manage their IA flows. 
 Sensitive – this is the same as Bellotti’s [7] normative 
privacy and is often defined by data protection and 
privacy legislation, or is generally considered sensitive by 
most users. 
5.3.2 Information Asset Holder (IAH) 
Building on the definition of an IA, the information sender and 
information receiver are each considered to be an information 
asset holder (IAH). We define an information asset holder as “an 
individual, group or organization which possesses one or more 
information assets”. This definition is kept broad to cover 
individuals, groups and organizations, as well as recognizing that 
the IAs an IAH holds, may consist of those it owns as well as 
those entrusted to it by other IAHs. 
In a technology-mediated interaction, an IAH may act as an 
information asset sender (IAS) or an information asset receiver 
(IAR). For example, an IAH acting as an IAS (e.g. a user filling in 
a form on a web site) may provide one or more IAs (e.g. address, 
date of birth, salary etc.) to another IAH acting as an IAR (e.g. a 
financial services organization using the web site to collect IAs 
for a credit card application). 
Privacy problems can occur when an IAS considers an IA to be 
sensitive, but an IAR does not, and therefore does not exercise 
adequate stewardship of the IA. 
5.3.3 Technology Lens (TL) 
We define a technology lens as, “a technology platform through 
which an information asset sender - actively or passively - passes 
one or more of their information assets to an information asset 
receiver”. 
5.4 Information Asset Holder Layers 
5.4.1 Overview 
The PST Framework views the provision of privacy by an IAH 
using a conceptual model similar to the Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model, which standardizes the functions of 
a communication system, as performed by the sender and receiver, 
into layers of abstraction. Within the OSI model each network 
layer consumes services provided by the layer below, and in turn 
provides services to the layer above. Similarly, in the PST 
Framework each IAH contains layers of increasing abstraction 
(Figure 4), with each layer relying on the layers below to function 
effectively. When an IAH acts as an IAR, there will be increasing 
privacy if all layers exist with sufficient attention and resources 
directed at all layers equally. 
Each layer requires the services of the layer directly below it, and 
influences all layers beneath it. For example, an IAR’s 
Information Privacy Culture Layer will not only influence 
information use and management [20, 21] in the Information Use 
Layer and Information Management Layer, but also determine if 
the principles operating at the Information Principles Layer are 
designed to minimally adhere to legislation, or if they are 
maximized to genuinely protect the interests of the IAS’s who 
entrust their IAs to the IAR, hence attempting to avoid 
“substantive harm” to an IAS [6]. 
 
Figure 4. Information Privacy Layers in an IAH 
Not all layers may exist in an IAH, or be only minimally 
implemented. For example, some degree of privacy is possible if 
an IAH implements only the Information Security Layer, e.g. by 
encrypting data files. However, privacy is likely to be threatened, 
as an IAH may find it difficult to manage the IAs in its 
possession. The IAH may therefore choose to implement the 
Information Management Layer, thus increasing the chance of 
maintaining privacy. 
The balance between technology and human factors alters when 
moving from the top to the bottom layers of the PST Framework. 
For example, the Information Security Layer will mostly consist 
of technical security controls (e.g. firewalls, encryption, anti-
virus, web traffic filtering etc), surrounded by some human 
activities in the shape of security management processes (e.g. 
audit, access management, patching, monitoring and security rules 
administration). In contrast, the activities at the Information 
Privacy Culture Layer will principally be focused on human 
factors, such as engendering an information security culture 
within the IAH. As some controls in each layer are optimally 
implemented by humans, an IAH must decide, for their particular 
context, the most suitable mixture of technology, processes and 
people when implementing effective privacy practice at each layer 
(e.g. a security guard at the office entrance or biometric 
authentication). 
When an IAH is acting as an IAS and engaging with a technology 
service it has not used before, an IAS’ privacy expectations and 
assumptions will be primarily focused on the top half of the PST 
Framework (e.g. trust in the IAR and/or the TL) rather than 
considering the potential security and privacy risks (Figure 4). For 
example, an IAS who has never used a shopping web site before 
may only consider the information privacy culture of the IAR, 
albeit based on their subjective opinion of the IAR’s ethics and 
culture; in short they will ask themselves, “Can I trust this 
organization to look after my information appropriately, and will 
it behave as I expect?”  
The actual privacy experiences of an IAH acting as an IAS are 
likely to be focused on the bottom half of the hierarchy (Figure 4). 
The security breaches of Sony’s PlayStation Network [53] - 
caused by failures in the lower layers of the hierarchy - provide an 
example of this. Customers signing up for Sony’s games networks 
probably had high initial organizational trust, because of its 
perceived good reputation. The loss of their personal details 
because of an information security failure is likely to have 
decreased their level of trust in Sony. PlayStation users are likely 
to have generalized broadly from their negative experiences [12], 
to other Sony technology services and/or other games networks. 
Focusing on the bottom half of the hierarchy will not always be 
restricted to the actual privacy experiences of an IAS. Even when 
interacting with a technology service for the first time, an IAS – 
especially when they have some technical knowledge or have 
received security awareness training - may check for certain types 
of trust symbols [56] at the Information Security Layer, e.g. the 
existence of an HTTPS padlock on a web site. However, reliance 
on such trust symbols may lead a user to incorrectly generalize 
this guidance and assume all websites supporting HTTPS are 
trustworthy [12]. 
The PST Framework assumes the privacy layers also exist when 
an IAH is an individual in possession of IAs. A reasonable 
criticism of the use of a layered approach for individuals is that 
their behavior is unlikely to strictly follow a hierarchy, and hence 
it is not feasible to empirically detect the layers. However, an 
individual may have sound information principles (Information 
Principles Layer) regarding who has access to information they 
consider sensitive, but are unable to put these into practice, due to 
their poor practices at the Information Management Layer and 
Information Security Layer (e.g. they use unencrypted USB 
memory sticks with sensitive information). For the purposes of 
clarity, we only describe the more usual situation in which the 
IAH is an organization.  
The following five sections describe each of the information 
privacy layers in an IAH (Figure 4), starting from the bottom. For 
each layer, a brief description of its function is given, where 
relevant, an overview of the services provided to the layer above, 
and an example illustrating typical activities at each layer for an 
organizational IAH are provided. 
5.4.2 Information Security Layer 
The Information Security Layer in an IAH protects IAs from 
threats leading to their loss, unauthorized access, corruption, 
interruption or unauthorized disclosure, thus providing assurance 
that any IA sharing decisions the IAH makes are correctly 
performed. The Information Security Layer provides services for 
the Information Management Layer, including: secure storage, 
access control, secure transfer and protection against malware and 
viruses. In this layer an organizational IAH will operate technical 
and operational controls, and must therefore have “[b]oth good 
intent and technical competence […] to ensure security” [11]. 
The Information Security Layer with its technical controls and 
security management processes must be considered a socio-
technical system – albeit principally technically focused. It is the 
combination of this layer and the information security culture 
component in the Information Privacy Culture Layer (Section 
5.4.6), which represents the full scope of the information security 
socio-technical system within the IAH. 
The Information Security Layer must be able to facilitate an 
IAH’s objectives by providing a sufficiently functionally rich set 
of services to support effective, yet secure, information 
management processes in the Information Management Layer. If 
information security is too restrictive, it will inhibit information 
management and hence impact an organization’s ability to achieve 
its objectives. For example, an Information Security Layer 
providing secure storage at only one physical location is unlikely 
to support the information management processes required to 
achieve an organization’s aims.  
5.4.3 Information Management Layer 
Choo et al. define information management as: 
 “[...] the capability to manage information effectively over 
the life cycle of information use, including sensing, 
collecting, organizing, processing and maintaining 
information.” [20]  
Following this definition, the Information Management Layer 
provides the tools and processes which allow an IAH to 
implement information lifecycle management, by providing 
control over their IAs in terms of collecting, locating, sharing, 
archiving, copying, mirroring, deleting, disseminating, backing up 
and restoring them. More generally, it encompasses the 
mechanisms (technological and managerial) which allow an IAH 
to be fully aware at all times of the location and nature of its IAs. 
At this layer, an organizational IAH may deploy and maintain a 
storage infrastructure and associated technology management 
processes suitable for the volume and type of data the IAH has to 
store and process.  
The mechanisms provided by the Information Management Layer 
should enact the policies defined in the Information Principles 
Layer, hence complying with the data access and governance 
requirements of relevant data protection and privacy legislation. 
An IAR should not only possess information management 
mechanisms to manage its own IAs, but also provide them via the 
TL to any IAS that has entrusted it with its IAs.  
An important role of the Information Management Layer is to 
protect information privacy by controlling access by human 
agents to data by only allowing them to ask pre-determined 
queries. A practical example of this is a shopkeeper selling 
alcohol, who should only be able to ask for proof a customer is 
over a certain age, rather than for their date of birth. 
5.4.4 Information Principles Layer 
The Information Principles Layer describes the rules which guide 
an IAH when using IAs. For example, an organizational IAH may 
have a privacy policy which sets out its general information 
principles, such as not sharing IAs unless expressly authorized to 
do so by the IAH to whom the IAs belong. 
As suggested in Figure 1, for an organizational IAH this layer can 
be split into principles concerned with the ‘letter of the law’ (e.g. 
meeting legislative requirements) and principles concerned with 
the ‘spirit of the law’ (e.g. exceeding legislative requirements or 
meeting best practices such as fair information practices). 
Some organizations may choose to have a thin Information 
Principles Layer minimally complying with legislative 
requirements. However, the necessarily generic nature of 
legislation can cause problems if organizations rely solely on it to 
guide their privacy practice. The emergence of new technologies, 
contexts and business models (e.g. increasingly ubiquitous 
computing such as smart metering and mobile location based 
services) is challenging the tenets of fair information practices 
(e.g. notice, consent, security and access) [6]. Organizations can 
process vast quantities of information willingly supplied by 
customers, whilst still adhering to the law [6]. Relying solely on 
legislation may lead organizations to fail to achieve the 
"appropriate balance between 'value information flows and being 
technology-enabled' on the one hand, and 'privacy-centric' or 
'trust-generating' concerns on the other." [6].  
Organizations possessing a “culture of privacy” [22], which flows 
from senior management, goes beyond mere compliance, and 
includes accountability for privacy, will be better equipped to 
avoid the financial loss, damage to legitimacy and the wider 
repercussions resulting from a data breach or misleading reuse and 
repurposing of information. As one respondent observed in 
Bamberger & Mulligan’s study: 
“[…] broader principles have to be developed that can 
guide privacy decisions consistently in a variety of 
contexts – privacy must be ‘strategic, part of the technical 
strategy and the business strategy.’” [6] 
Organizations with a desire to avoid substantive harm to 
customers’ privacy are likely to develop and implement their own 
global policies and procedures – company law - relating to 
privacy, and exceeding legislative requirements [6]. This 
organization-specific ‘law’ sits between the ‘letter of the law’ and 
the ‘spirit of the law’ within the Information Principles Layer. 
As this layer is concerned with principles, it may seem more 
logical to place it higher in the PST Framework. However, the 
enactment of information principles at this layer relies on the 
Information Management Layer directly beneath it, and the 
Information Use Layer above needs to base its definition of how 
information is used on the principles set out in this layer. 
5.4.5 Information Use Layer 
Within the PST Framework, information use is divided into 
different categories, determined by whether an IAH is acting as an 
IAS or IAR. When an IAH acts as an IAR the Information Use 
Layer consists of: 
 Intended information use: An IAR’s intended use for its 
IAs, as set out in its privacy policy. 
 Advertised information use: The use of its IAs, which an 
IAR may describe in its web site or advertising literature.  
 Actual information use: The actual use an IAR makes of 
its IAs. 
An organizational IAR may set out their intended information use 
in their web site privacy policy. However, because of commercial 
pressures and technical limitations, an IAR’s actual information 
use may differ from the intended information use stated in its 
privacy policy. 
The first two types of information use - intended information use 
and advertised information use - are considered static in the sense 
they rarely change. The third type – actual information use – 
should be accurate, timely and easily accessible via the TL. The 
provision of this information is the feedback suggested by Bellotti 
& Sellen [7, 8], and is required to enable a user to make informed 
IA sharing decisions at the Information Management Layer of the 
TL. However, actual information use may only be discovered 
inadvertently or after the event [3, 33], which may lead to an 
emotional response and rejection of the technology or IAR [2]. 
When an IAH acts as an IAS, the Information Use Layer consists 
of: 
 Experienced information use: This is the actual 
information use as experienced by the IAS.  
 Expected information use: This is based on the 
assumptions and expectations the IAS has concerning 
primary and secondary uses of their IAs, which are 
determined by their understanding of the IAR’s intended 
information use, the IAS’s assumptions and expectations 
of the TL and IAR, and the IAR’s advertised information 
use. 
Unlike the types of information use when an IAH is acting as an 
IAR, expected information use and experienced information use 
are not codified, as they are cognitive constructs within an IAS. 
The reason for the distinction between experienced information 
use and actual information use in the PST Framework is to 
capture the idea that an IAS can only feel a privacy invasion if 
they are aware of it (like the example of the staff in the university 
common room discussed earlier [3]). Experienced information use 
should equal actual information use, but an IAS’s perception of 
actual information use can be deliberately or inadvertently 
modified by: 
 the TL not providing accurate or timely feedback 
mechanisms; 
 the IAS ignoring or underplaying the effect of actions on 
their privacy, perhaps due to personality traits or 
experiences of the IAS; and 
 deliberate misrepresentation by the IAR. 
This filtering of actual information use results in experienced 
information use, which may be a subset of the former, or 
potentially a disjoint set. 
Perceived information usage is one of three privacy factors a user 
considers when engaging in a technology-mediated interaction, 
and is an important influence on the privacy risk vs. benefit trade-
off a user makes [2]. However, the different types of information 
use described here suggest an IAS is unlikely to be provided with 
a complete view of information use. This is likely to impact the 
privacy risk vs. benefit trade-offs an IAS makes, as it will be 
unable to predict the consequences of releasing their IAs.  
The misalignment between expected information use and 
experienced information use in the Information Use Layer leads to 
the privacy behavior of a TL or IAR not matching the 
expectations and assumptions of the affected IAS. As a result, the 
IAS is likely to experience an emotive response, believe a privacy 
invasion has occurred, and reject the TL and/or IAR; this leads to 
a change over time in the privacy perceptions of the IAS - a 
“privacy invasion cycle” [2]. 
5.4.6 Information Privacy Culture Layer 
The Information Privacy Culture layer assists the IAH in making 
decisions about what IAs to collect, store, disseminate and share. 
It is required when there is no guidance available in the 
Information Use Layer and Information Principles Layer to direct 
the decision making processes concerning the use of IAs – these 
layers being largely responsible for the formation of an 
organization’s privacy and information policies.  
 
Figure 5. Composition of Information Privacy Culture Layer 
If an IAH finds itself facing a decision about the use of an IA for 
the first time, the decision is likely to be influenced by the IAH’s 
information ethics, information culture, and its ability and desire 
to protect the IAs entrusted to it i.e. the information security 
culture of the IAH. We argue that the Information Privacy Culture 
Layer is therefore created from the intersection of information 
culture, information ethics and information security culture 
(Figure 5). This reflects the influence of these areas, whilst 
recognizing that each encompasses a wider area of influence on 
overall information management and use within the IAH. We 
define information privacy culture as, “the ethical position an 
organization, group or individual, takes with respect to the 
collection, use, dissemination and disposal of its information 
assets, particularly when those information assets are considered 
sensitive by those parties entrusting them”. 
Due to its position at the top of the PST Framework, the 
Information Privacy Culture Layer influences all attitudes and 
activity concerned with privacy in the IAR. For example, if an 
IAR has to make a decision about the use of an IA, this decision 
may lead to a change in the IAR’s information security culture, 
e.g. if the IAR now has to protect a new type of IA from a 
potentially new threat, or respond to new technology or market 
demands for different use of its IAs.  
Two studies by Choo et al. [20, 21] concluded that information 
culture in organizations has a significant influence on information 
use - as opposed to information management. This conclusion 
aligns with the IAH information privacy layers in the PST 
Framework, which places the Information Use Layer directly 
under the Information Privacy Culture Layer, with the Information 
Management Layer placed further down the PST Framework. In 
Bamberger & Mulligan’s study, CPOs in organizations who set 
out to meet their customers’ privacy expectations, used normative 
language such as “values”, “ethical tone”, “moral tone” and 
“integrity” [6]. 
5.5 IAH Layer Pressures 
Privacy problems may arise if a layer comes under pressure from 
other conflicting objectives. The PST Framework assumes the 
same layers exist in an IAH - irrespective of whether it is acting as 
an IAS or an IAR - whether it is an individual or organization; this 
facilitates understanding the impact of these pressures.  
 
Two different technologies are described to illustrate the potential 
pressures operating at different layers within an individual and 
organizational IAH:  
 Individual IAH – The goal of a P2P user is to download 
media content - possibly pirated. Using the PST 
Framework highlights how this goal might result in 
pressures on the individual’s Information Security Layer 
(e.g. installing P2P software from an unknown source), 
Information Principles Layer (e.g. allowing P2P software 
to share files in the background might be against the 
user’s normal preference to control which files they 
share), and Information Privacy Culture Layer (e.g. 
justifying a weakened ethical position on stealing, when 
accessing pirated material).  
 Organizational IAH - The original objective of many 
CCTV installations in the UK was to reduce crime in city 
centers. However, there have been numerous cases of 
local government authorities using the UK Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) to use their CCTV 
installations to carry out surveillance for minor offences, 
including littering, dog fouling, and people illegally 
claiming sickness benefit [63]. This mission creep is often 
the result of pressure to catch offenders despite resource 
constraints – using existing CCTV installations offers an 
easy solution. If the Information Privacy Culture Layer 
operating in a local government authority does not fully 
consider the ethical ramifications of doing this, the ‘spirit 
of the law’ component of the Information Principles Layer 
may be compromised, even if the ‘letter of the law’ 
component ostensibly follows RIPA guidelines. 
The PST Framework is therefore a useful mechanism to consider 
the likely impact of decisions on privacy – in short, is a decision 
likely to strengthen or weaken privacy? 
5.6 TL Layers 
5.6.1 Overview 
A similar layered approach to that described for an IAH also 
facilitates a better understanding of the relationship between an 
IAR and a TL. It also highlights how activities at a particular layer 
in an IAR influence the corresponding layer in a TL, e.g. how an 
IAR’s Information Management Layer practices influence the 
design of the Information Management Layer in a TL. 
The next four sections briefly describe the four information 
privacy layers in a TL, relating them to PbD; as a TL cannot 
possess an Information Privacy Culture, this layer is omitted. 
5.6.2 Information Security Layer 
If a TL leaks IAs provided to an IAR by an IAS, the IAS is likely 
to mistrust or reject the TL and/or IAR [2]. Like the IAH, 
provision of effective security is a prerequisite for privacy in the 
TL.  
5.6.3 Information Management Layer 
A TL should provide information control to an IAS that is 
integrated fully with the activities in an IAR’s Information 
Management Layer. This layer of a TL should provide the control 
component in the feedback and control mechanisms required for 
potentially privacy invasive technology [7, 8]. However, care 
must be exercised when providing users with control of their 
personal information, as two of the five designing for privacy 
pitfalls identified by Lederer et al. [41] concern the regulation of 
privacy: 
1. Emphasizing configuration over action: The 
information management provided to the IAS “[...] 
requires excessive configuration to create and maintain 
privacy.” [41] When an IAS uses a TL to perform an 
activity, the information management provided by the TL 
must allow privacy regulation to be “[...] an embedded 
component of that activity.” [41]. 
2. Lacking coarse-grained control: An IAS should be 
provided with the ability to stop and start information 
disclosure, as well as offering subtle results through use of 
a small combination of simple controls, rather than 
complex fine-grained controls [41]. 
5.6.4 Information Principles Layer  
This layer is responsible for ensuring that the design and operation 
of the TL follows fair information practices, along with relevant 
data protection and privacy legislation. Langheinrich [40] 
suggests that “[...] specific legal requirements such as use 
limitation, access or repudiation [...]” (p.288) should be addressed 
by the design principle of providing mechanisms for access and 
recourse. 
As well as meeting minimum legal requirements, the design of a 
TL should embody information principles, such as those 
suggested for ubiquitous computing [40], which aim to create 
mutual trust and respect between the IAS and IAR; these include: 
1. Notice: A TL should make an IAS aware of what data is 
being collected, and for what purpose. 
2. Choice and consent: A TL should provide an IAS with 
an explicit option to opt-in or opt-out of data collection 
and/or services. 
3. Anonymity and pseudonymity: The design process for 
a TL should explicitly consider whether an IAS is 
allowed to remain anonymous or pseudonymous, even if 
the ultimate decision is not to implement this principle. 
4. Proximity: A TL should only ask for consent for data 
collection which typically requires permission. 
5. Locality: Where relevant, a TL should keep information 
flows to a restricted geographic area to stop the 
unnecessarily wide propagation of IAs. 
The Information Principles Layer in an IAH relies upon the 
Information Management Layer to enact the IAH’s principles. 
Similarly in a TL, technical mechanisms should be provided at the 
Information Management Layer to provide the functionality to 
implement these design principles. 
5.6.5 Information Use Layer  
The Information Use Layer in a TL should provide technical 
mechanisms to reflect the information use defined by an IAR’s 
Information Use Layer. The TL should achieve this by providing 
an IAS with feedback on the capture, construction (i.e. use), 
accessibility and purpose of the information being collected and 
used [8]. The TL should also provide an IAS with transparent 
information flows, so potential and actual information flows are 
not obscured [41]. 
  
Bellotti observed: 
“Whilst lack of feedback already causes problems in non-
explicitly collaborative computing contexts, it is far more 
serious for CSCW and CMC7. As such systems 
increasingly support information sharing and 
communication, it is important for people to understand 
when they and their information are accessible, when, and 
to whom.” [7] 
A practical example of providing users with an accurate view of 
information use in a collaborative computing context is the 
prototype file-sharing manager of Whalen et al. [74], which 
dynamically informs users of the files currently being shared 
within a collaborative workspace. 
6. TRUST AND THE PST FRAMEWORK 
Having examined the privacy layers in an IAH and a TL, it is 
instructive to consider how the PST Framework can be used to 
assist practitioners in understanding how activities at each layer 
contribute to the construction of trust between trustor and trustee. 
Camp et al. suggest that “trust is necessary and extant on the 
Internet” on three levels: 1) “the nuts and bolts level of the router 
system”; 2) “other people will behave in ways that uphold the 
community norms”; and 3) “institutions – such as Internet 
businesses - will conduct themselves in ways that are conducive to 
productive ongoing transactions” [12], hinting at the appositeness 
of a layered approach to the construction of trust. Riegelsberger et 
al.’s [56] trust framework can be used to understand how 
activities at each layer contribute to overall trust between an IAS 
and an IAR.  
One of the intrinsic properties of a trustee that engenders trust in a 
trustor is ability i.e. “[…] whether an actor is able to fulfill [what 
is requested of them]” [56], which includes factors such as 
professionalism and domain-specific expertise; similar to Camp’s 
idea of competence as a component of operational trust [11]. 
Ability (or competence) also applies to technical trustees and 
includes the following dimensions: confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, non-repudiation, access-control, error rates and 
availability [56] - dimensions which neatly fall into the 
Information Security Layer. Ability must therefore be expanded to 
include the ability of technology service to safeguard its IAs. As 
one respondent in Bamberger & Mulligan’s study observed, the 
ability to “deliver those consistent experiences, compliant 
experiences, you know, that’s trust” [6].  
The other two intrinsic properties of a trustee are internalized 
norms (e.g. honesty, credibility, reliability, dependability, good 
morals, goodwill, openness etc.) and benevolence (e.g. good 
corporate citizenship, exceeding customers’ expectations, good 
intentions etc) [56], encapsulated in Camp’s idea of intent as a 
component of operational trust [11]. Both of these properties are 
likely to be significantly influenced by organizational culture and 
ethics, and hence will also affect the Information Privacy Culture 
Layer – if an organization has generally good morals it is likely to 
have a similarly good information culture and information ethics. 
The intrinsic properties of a trustee identified can be mapped to 
the privacy layers in an IAR (Table 2); note how the Information 
Principles Layer is split between ability and internalized norms 
and benevolence. 
                                                                
7 Computer-supported collaborative work and computer-mediated 
communication respectively. 
Table 2. Mapping between the Trust Framework of 
Riegelsberger et al. and IAR Information Privacy Layers 
Intrinsic 
Property of 
Trustee 
IAR Information Privacy Layer 
Ability  Information Security Layer – ability to 
protect IAs. 
 Information Management Layer – ability 
to manage IAs effectively. 
 Information Principles Layer – Adherence 
to relevant data protection legislation 
where available (‘letter of the law’). 
Internalized 
Norms and 
Benevolence 
 Information Principles Layer – Principles 
governing information use which exceed 
legislative requirements (e.g. ‘company 
law’ [6]), which aim to respect consumers’ 
information and their privacy expectations 
(‘spirit of the law’). 
 Information Use Layer – Information use, 
notification and consent, which exceeds 
the safeguards set out in fair information 
practices. 
 Information Privacy Culture Layer – 
Actual use of information is as expected 
by the trustor. 
 
An example of privacy being only one dimension of ability is a 
scenario in which an IAS (e-commerce customer) browses an 
IAR’s (vendor’s) web site for products, trusting their ability to 
deliver a quality product as requested, but not comfortable to trust 
their ability to maintain the IAS’s privacy. This may be because of 
the IAS’s mistrust in the IAR’s privacy practice and/or TL (web 
site). In the former case, the consumer may telephone the vendor 
with their credit card and address details, in the latter case they 
may send a check, or pay with cash. 
The IAR, through the technology service and other channels (e.g. 
advertising, brand awareness etc.), must make its privacy practice 
visible to the IAS. This is achieved through trust symbols, and 
visibility of trust symptoms [56] at each layer of the PST 
Framework. For example, the use of the trust symbol HTTPS may 
lead an IAS to trust a technology service at the Information 
Security Layer, but not at the Information Principles Layer due to 
an unclear privacy policy, or the trust symptom of poor feedback 
on a review web site regarding the use of IAs by the IAR for 
targeted marketing. The overall trust between the IAS and a 
technology service is therefore a function of the trust at each of 
the layers. Table 3 provides examples of the trust signals provided 
by a technology service at each layer. 
Schneier [57] suggests there are four societal pressures: 1) moral 
pressure; 2) reputational pressure; 3) institutional pressure; and 4) 
security systems (i.e. defenses and detection systems), which 
make it more difficult and less attractive – in terms of 
consequences - for a trustee in a transaction to defect and serve its 
own self-interest. The existence of these pressures assists a trustor 
in making a risk trade-off when deciding whether to trust a 
trustee. As shown in Table 4, these societal pressures are likely to 
influence an IAR’s privacy practice activities, and can therefore 
be mapped to four of the layers in the PST framework. 
Table 3. Examples of Trust Signals at each Information 
Privacy Layer in an IAR and TL 
Information 
Privacy 
Layer 
Example of Technology Service’s Trust 
Signals  
Information 
Privacy 
Culture 
An IAR’s privacy decision making 
concerning IAs entrusted to it - directly or 
vicariously experienced by an IAS. For 
example an IAR who is known for passing 
IAs entrusted to it to other IARs for its own 
financial gain will suffer a reduction in trust. 
Information 
Use 
The clarity and transparency of an IAR’s 
statement of intended information use, e.g. its 
privacy policy (although users have a 
reluctance to read privacy policies [72]). 
The degree of alignment between expected 
information use and experienced information 
use. 
Information 
Principles 
The statements set out in a technology 
service’s privacy policy. 
Information 
Management 
The ability of a technology service to provide 
technology and processes for an IAS to 
exercise control over the IAs it has entrusted 
to the technology service.  
Information 
Security 
Use of technical and operational security 
controls to secure IAs, e.g. the use of HTTPS 
on a web site, user authentication, secure 
document storage etc. 
 
Table 4. Mapping between Schneier’s societal pressures [57] 
and IAR Information Privacy Layers 
Societal 
Pressure 
IAR 
Information 
Privacy Layer 
Example of good privacy 
behavior 
Moral Information 
Privacy Culture 
Layer  
It feels wrong for the 
organization to cheat its 
customers. 
Reputational  Information 
Principles Layer 
(‘spirit of the 
law’) 
The organization has a 
reputation for not passing 
customers’ information to 
third-parties without their 
permission. 
Institutional  Information 
Principles Layer 
(‘letter of the 
law’) 
The organization abides by 
applicable data protection 
and privacy regulations and 
rules to avoid sanctions. 
Security 
Systems 
Information 
Security Layer 
The organization’s systems 
create audit trails of its 
activities, which are 
available to external 
auditors. 
 
Although the Information Use Layer is omitted from Table 4, all 
four societal pressures will directly influence an organization’s 
information use. For example, moral, reputational and institutional 
pressure, and security systems are all likely to prevent an 
organization from using its customers’ sensitive personal data for 
social sorting or marketing purposes. 
7. APPLYING THE PST FRAMEWORK 
To provide a proof-of-concept application of the PST Framework, 
we use it to show how potential privacy problems can be 
identified for a new technology: smart metering. This section 
concentrates on the privacy issues arising from the collection of 
detailed electricity consumption information from smart meters, 
and its transmission across the smart grid. A concise definition of 
smart grid is that it “[...] uses intelligent transmission and 
distribution networks to deliver electricity.” [37]. Smart grids 
contain multiple networks: distribution, transmission, energy 
trading, load monitoring, substation, premises, operations and 
monitoring.  
Existing electricity meters typically have more than one tariff (e.g. 
in the UK meters usually have a day and night tariff), measure 
total use for a household, and are usually read by a human 
operator visiting customers’ homes quarterly. Smart meters 
automatically take readings at finer time intervals (e.g. every half 
hour), automatically transmitting them to an energy company via 
a smart grid.  
This section assumes the IAS in the PST Framework is a 
household, the energy company an IAR, and the smart meter and 
energy consumption network within the smart grid a TL. To keep 
this example concise, this section will consider only the IAR and 
TL components of the PST Framework.  
Quinn [54] has discussed many of the privacy issues arising from 
smart metering, but these have not been set within a framework. 
The purpose of this section is not to uncover new privacy issues, 
but illustrate how the PST Framework can be used to highlight 
potential shortcomings in the information privacy practices of 
energy companies, identifying potential weaknesses and where 
technology management effort should be concentrated.  
7.1 Smart Metering 
7.1.1 Privacy Concerns of Technology 
Smart grids and the associated smart metering, although strongly 
encouraged by US and European governments since 2007, have 
led to concerns about peoples’ security and privacy [4]. 
Furthermore, a UK pilot found no statistically significant cost 
savings [quoted in 4]. A high-level Privacy Impact Assessment 
(PIA) in 2009 highlighted a significant number of shortcomings in 
current attempts to address the privacy issues raised by smart 
meters [quoted in 17]. In 2009, the Dutch Senate rejected a Smart 
Metering Bill as a violation of the right to privacy under the 
European Convention on Human Rights [66]. 
The privacy implications of fine-grained meter reading have 
already been highlighted [47]: there is the potential for side-
channel leakage of detailed information of a household’s 
activities, using techniques such as Non-Intrusive Load 
Monitoring (NILM) systems and algorithms [49]. The level of 
information that can be determined is related to the meter reading 
frequency, with major appliances identifiable when meter reading 
takes place every minute [47]. A recent study demonstrated how 
residents’ presence and sleep cycles could be estimated with high 
confidence using relatively unsophisticated monitoring equipment 
and algorithms [42]. 
Most of the discussions regarding the privacy implications of 
smart meters focus on protecting the privacy of a household from 
the outside world. However, there are also concerns about the 
privacy of a household’s individual members, i.e. from each other 
[47]. 
There are two paradigms for smart metering [4], each with 
different privacy implications: 1) local feedback or decentralized 
in which the meter performs data processing of fine grained 
readings and passes measurements to the energy company at a 
coarser interval, e.g. once a day or once a month; 2) remote 
feedback or centralized in which the meter sends detailed 
consumption information to the energy company. In the former 
case, energy use management is carried out manually, or provided 
within the household by a separate system. In the latter case, the 
energy company provides a web interface for the consumer to 
manage energy use [4]; local feedback is the preferred approach 
for the UK [26]. 
7.1.2 Information Asset Receiver (IAR) 
7.1.2.1 Information Security Layer  
If a remote feedback or centralized paradigm is used, an IAR will 
become responsible for a vast quantity of sensitive information 
assets. Initial estimates for the 47 million meters in the UK 
suggest data volumes of around 9Pb per year, assuming half 
hourly readings [4]. But there has been little information security 
research on the potential vulnerabilities, threats and risks of 
managing the real-time IAs, possibly because the assumption is 
that existing information security provisions will suffice. A 
supervisory system will be required to efficiently process vast 
quantities of data, allowing the energy company to monitor the 
smart grid and detect security or system failures [37] 
Quinn [54] refers to the need for “technological protections” to 
protect data, which is the traditional paradigm for information 
security. Given the sensitivity around smart metering and the need 
to engender consumer trust in the rollout, the PST Framework 
should be used to correctly align information security processes 
with the requirements of the other layers. For example, IARs must 
ensure activities at this layer are part of an organizational 
information security culture to prevent human violations of 
security policy, such as copying sensitive consumer information to 
external media. Information handling processes must be closely 
examined for vulnerabilities, and technical or operational 
solutions designed to counter potential threats unique to smart 
metering. 
IARs should also not be overly optimistic concerning potential 
security risks and should ensure their organizational culture plans 
for failure; working with smart meter vendors to develop recovery 
strategies [46]. 
7.1.2.2 Information Management Layer 
Information management can be split into that used by an IAR to 
manage its information assets, and that provided via the TL to 
allow an IAS to control the flow of their information assets to the 
IAR. 
With centralized smart metering in particular, an IAR will be 
responsible for a vast quantity of information assets, and it will 
therefore be imperative that rigorous processes are put in place for 
information lifecycle management, from collection of information 
from smart meters, to the organizing, processing, dissemination 
and deletion of that information.  
As well as managing its own information assets, an IAR’s 
information management processes should also provide an IAS 
with the ability to control its own information flows. Quinn [54] 
suggests two approaches to providing users with the ability to 
control information. The first is a hierarchical opt-in/opt-out 
regime, with a coarse-grained default opt-out as suggested by 
[41]; this may cause a rise in the energy rate charged due to lack 
of real-time energy information. The second option is to impose a 
privacy tariff wherein customers pay a premium to protect their 
privacy. Once IARs have determined their business strategy, they 
must ensure this flows correctly down to this layer and seamlessly 
through to the TL.  
7.1.2.3 Information Principles Layer 
Concerns were raised in 2009 about the lack of formal privacy 
policies, standards or procedures – what Quinn [54] calls 
”procedural best practices” - for smart metering [17]. Such 
policies should be placed at this layer, and represent a bare 
minimum of adherence – energy companies should seek to better 
these to gain consumer confidence and gain a competitive edge. 
In the UK, DECC’s response to the UK Government’s Smart 
Metering Programme suggests energy companies obtain explicit 
consent for any access to personal data over and above that “[…] 
required to fulfill regulatory duties.” [26] Therefore regulatory 
duties will need careful definition, with a mechanism for changing 
this definition when legitimately required [26]. It is likely that 
such regulatory duties will relate to distribution system operation, 
billing and planning, whose use of personal data can be minimized 
or avoided [4, 47]. The information principles at this layer will 
therefore need to be built around the agreed definition of 
regulatory duties, aim for data minimization, and protect the 
privacy of individual members of a household, not just the whole 
household [35].  
7.1.2.4 Information Use Layer 
Quinn [54] provides a summary of potential uses of smart meter 
information, categorizing them as utility services (e.g. the energy 
company), edge services (e.g. services provided to the consumer), 
or other uses (e.g. insurance adjustment and marketing). There is 
therefore the potential for commercial exploitation, or social 
sorting, through the use of data mining techniques on households’ 
consumption patterns [17]. For example, the final privacy policy 
for Google’s PowerMeter service has yet to be defined, allowing it 
to use information on households’ electricity consumption for 
marketing purposes [46]. 
Given the potential for profiling individuals and repurposing of 
consumption information, IARs will need to provide an explicit 
definition of the intended and actual use of consumption 
information from smart meters, founded on regulatory and 
corporate information principles set out in the Information 
Principles Layer. 
7.1.2.5 Information Privacy Culture Layer 
The advent of smart metering means the culture of energy 
companies must shift from one chiefly focused on maintaining the 
availability of energy supplies, to one which includes 
safeguarding consumers’ privacy. 
The requirement for energy companies to have an information 
security culture will also be greater than ever, given the extensive 
regulation and governance requirements, and the complexity of 
the smart grid and the associated vulnerabilities caused by human 
agency and processes. Energy companies must have an 
information security culture that is sufficiently open to allow 
greater collaboration between academia, industry and government 
in evaluating smart grid security mechanisms [5, 46]. 
Finally, as if to stress the importance of an ethical approach to 
smart meter information use, a 2009 report8 by the World 
Economic Forum - in partnership with Accenture – stated that 
“[u]tilities, regulators and governments will need to give 
consumers confidence that their usage data is being handled by 
authorized parties in an ethical manner. Such assurances will be 
the key when developing the public perception of these new 
technologies.” [quoted in 17] 
7.1.3 Technology Lens (TL) 
Cavoukian [17] proposes the use of SmartPrivacy design 
guidelines – essentially PbD with a wider scope encompassing 
law, accountability, data security, fair information practices etc. – 
for the entire smart metering domain. This section briefly 
considers some of the privacy and security concerns around the 
smart metering TL. 
7.1.3.1 Information Security Layer  
Some of the security concerns of smart metering that have been 
raised include, consumer fraud, smart meter ‘worms’ [46], and the 
potential for damage to promulgate between transmission systems 
because of their interconnectedness [37]. 
Another major security concern is the ability to remotely switch 
off electricity supplies to large numbers of customers, providing 
an unparalleled level of vulnerability from cyber-attacks or 
software failures [5]. This last vulnerability is recognized by NIST 
in the US and Ofgem in the UK, and requires a solution at this 
layer using security techniques such as shared control, backup 
encryption keys, local override and rate-limiting mechanisms [5].  
7.1.3.2 Information Management Layer 
As one of the aims of smart metering is to allow customers to 
control their energy use, lowering overall demand and electricity 
costs, they will need to be provided with the ability to define and 
control their energy policy (e.g. by setting household devices to 
automatically switch on and off at user-specified times) [5]. This 
layer must therefore provide the user with accurate and timely 
tariff and consumption information, along with the potential costs 
and savings for switching each household appliance on or off. 
This layer should also provide households with strong control 
over the IAs sent to the IAR [42]. 
7.1.3.3 Information Principles Layer 
Cavoukian [17] offers a high-level set of SmartPrivacy design 
principles, from which the information principles at this layer 
could be created. Substantial engineering work is still required 
however to understand how these principles are implemented in 
the two layers below (Information Management Layer and 
Information Security Layer). 
One possible technological approach to minimizing the data has 
been suggested by Lisovich et al. [42]; this uses protocols to carry 
out most of the data processing in the residence, with hard rules 
regarding the transmission of certain types of information.  
7.1.3.4 Information Use Layer 
One of the key engineering principles of PbD is data minimization 
[38], and one of the recommendations for smart metering design is 
the collection of the minimum amount of data required [17]. To 
simplify the problems of different information use requirements 
for householders and energy companies, Quinn [54] proposes 
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bundling, so technology would need to enable the capture and use 
of information on the dimensions of: customer (individual to 
aggregated); time-shifting (real-time to delayed); and resolution 
(meter level to consumer level). These different bundles would be 
selectable by the consumer and would be an important 
determinant in eventual information use, along with, for example, 
information sharing preferences. 
8. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK 
We have presented an integrated Privacy, Security and Trust 
(PST) Framework as a tool for understanding the composition of 
privacy for IAHs partaking in technology-mediated interactions. It 
offers a socio-technical approach to placing information security, 
privacy in technology-mediated interactions, trust, PbD 
guidelines, technology management processes, data protection and 
governance legislation, and information and security culture and 
ethics into a single framework.  
For practitioners, the PST Framework addresses two problems: 1) 
it provides a clear hierarchy of the activities needed to plan, 
deploy and maintain privacy, from the softer organizational 
attributes of culture down to the pragmatic considerations of 
information security; and 2) it offers a framework to assist in 
understanding where weaknesses may be in an IAH’s privacy 
activities. More specifically, the PST Framework: 1) clearly 
delineates information security from privacy; 2) integrates 
information security culture with privacy; and 3) places data 
protection at the heart of those activities involved in maintaining 
privacy, rather than restricting it to a function of information 
security. 
The PST Framework should not be considered prescriptive – a 
single privacy practice suitable for all IAHs and all contexts is 
infeasible. Nevertheless, the framework provides a common 
reference model with a layered approach, which supports 
information privacy provision founded on sound information 
security practices and information management. The lower four 
layers of the PST Framework provide a structure into which an 
IAH can place its processes and procedures for privacy protection, 
to not only mitigate the risk of legislative action, but also protect 
IASs from substantive harms to their privacy. 
The PST Framework also helps an IAH to: 
 determine if the services provided at each layer are 
sufficiently rich; and 
 check the existence of a logical privacy hierarchy flowing 
from top to bottom thus: 
o Information Privacy Culture Layer: A strategic 
view of privacy and security based on an explicit 
ethical position. 
o Information Use Layer: A clear, accurate statement 
of intended and advertised IA use. 
o Information Principles Layer: Adherence to the 
legislative and governance environment for IAs, as 
well as ‘company law’ [6] (where applicable). 
o Information Management Layer: Processes, policies 
and technical mechanisms used for IA management, 
which provide accurate and timely actual IA use. 
o Information Security Layer: The technical and 
physical controls to ensure security of IAs against 
identified threats. 
The PST Framework could also provide a basis for the 
development of a two-dimensional Capability Maturity Model 
[52] for privacy, in which privacy provision in each layer not only 
passes through the steps of Initial, Repeatable, Defined, Managed 
and Optimizing, but the addition of each layer, from the 
Information Security Layer above, provides evidence of 
increasing privacy maturity, until an ideal IAH in which all layers 
exist, operating at the Optimizing level. 
The ability to measure the maturity of an IAR’s privacy practice at 
each layer of the PST Framework, and trace its privacy activities 
through its technology platform, may provide a useful basis for 
structuring audits – particularly Privacy Impact Assessments 
(PIA) – of IAR’s actual information privacy practices. A PIA 
could be structured to ensure each layer is the correct refinement 
of the layer above. 
One of the possible criticisms of the PST Framework is that a 
layered paradigm is too simplistic, resulting in an IAH creating a 
set of disconnected ‘islands of responsibility’ at each layer, with 
their boundaries becoming points of weakness. A partially ordered 
set may therefore be a more accurate representation of the 
functional dependencies among the people, processes and 
technology required for effective privacy practice. However, the 
PST Framework – in common with many frameworks - is a 
simplified and abstracted view of reality, yet sufficient to assist 
practitioners in reasoning about the capability of the lower layers 
to support the upper layers. 
The OSI network model analogy used in the PST Framework 
could be developed further, so that each layer has a technology-
agnostic interface defining the services it offers to the layer above. 
This would allow an IAH to determine if each layer provides a 
sufficiently rich set of services to support the layer above. For 
example, an IAH would be able to confirm that its information 
management (Information Management Layer) was able to 
support the relevant legislative data protection requirements 
(Information Principles Layer), such as the ability to quickly 
locate all copies of an IA relating to a subject access request, or to 
locate and delete all copies of an IA. 
With the concept of a TL, the PST Framework also allows tracing 
of links between the privacy activities of an IAR and the design of 
a TL. Using the PST Framework, an IAR can determine if their 
information principles are correctly instantiated in the TL, and 
that the information management mechanisms within its user 
interface (e.g. the ability to opt-in/opt-out, and the feedback and 
control provided by the Information Management Layer) can be 
supported by the services offered by the IAR’s Information 
Management Layer. It is hoped such an approach will help to 
avoid situations wherein the sound privacy practices of an IAR are 
distorted by a poorly designed or implemented TL. Work in 
formalizing HIPAA legislation using Prolog to check the 
compliance of a simple web-based messaging system [39] could 
offer a useful possible approach to check the correctness of each 
layer’s implementation in the IAR and associated TL. 
This paper has described several new constructs within the PST 
Framework: 
 Technology lens: A layered view of the privacy 
characteristics of a technology linked to PbD principles.  
 Technology service: A socio-technical system formed 
from an IAR and TL. 
 Information privacy culture: Formed from the 
intersection of an IAH’s information culture, information 
security culture, and information ethics.  
Development of the PST Framework is at an early stage, and there 
remains much work to complete. This paper has shown it to be a 
valuable tool - particularly for practitioners - to provide a roadmap 
to maintaining privacy. Indeed, the PST Framework can be used 
by organizations to define what “a wonderful privacy program 
means” [6]. 
Our title for this paper is “Privacy is a Process, not a PET”, 
because if the PST Framework is used to help in implementing 
effective privacy practice in organizations - seamlessly linking it 
to a technology lens designed according to PbD principles – there 
should be less need for PETS. 
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